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I. INTRODUCTION

O
O

n October 5, 2013, United States forces captured and detained Abu
Anas Al-Libi in Tripoli, Libya. Al-Libi was, at one time, a senior member
of Al-Qaeda with close links to Osama Bin Laden and, according to U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry, was a “legal and appropriate target.”1 Following his capture, Al-Libi was delivered to a U.S. warship, the USS San
Antonio (LPD 17), and reportedly interrogated.2 He was transferred to the
* Captain Gordon Modarai, JAGC, U.S. Navy; Commander David O’Connell, U.S.
Coast Guard; Lieutenant Colonel Tim Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps; and, Lieutenant Commander James Farrant, Barrister, U.K. Royal Navy are faculty members at the International Law Department, U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are those
of the authors in their personal capacities and do not necessarily represent the views of
their governments.
1. US Commando Raids: Kerry Defends al-Liby Capture, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24426033 [hereinafter BBC NEWS AFRICA].
2. Ernesto Londoño and Karen DeYoung, Libyan Terrorism Suspect Held Aboard Warship is Brought to U.S., THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2013) http://www. washing817
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U.S. within eight days of his capture. On October 14, 2013, Al-Libi entered
not-guilty pleas to charges stemming from the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing
campaign against U.S. embassies in East Africa.3
This article addresses three issues concerning Al-Libi’s capture and detention. Part II examines the bases on which the U.S. might lawfully have
crossed the Libyan border to conduct the operation, since incursion by one
State into another can amount to a breach of international law.4 Part III
assesses the grounds, under international law, on which the U.S. might lawfully have captured Al-Libi. Part IV addresses the circumstances of AlLibi’s subsequent detention. In conclusion, Part V lists several principles
that can inform similar operations in the future.
II. CROSSING THE LIBYAN BORDER
An incursion into another State’s territory violates the use of force prohibition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, “even if it is not intended to deprive
that State of part of its territory and if the invading troops are meant to
withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited operation .
. . .”5 The authors therefore accept as a starting point that when U.S. forces crossed the Libyan border and captured Al-Libi, the operation amounted
to a use of force against Libya. Three circumstances, however, may preclude the wrongfulness of a sovereignty violation where it also amounts to
a use of force: Security Council authorization; consent from the territorial
State; and, self-defense.6 The latter two are relevant to the facts surrounding Al-Libi’s capture, and will be considered in turn.
tonpost.com/world/national-security/libyan-suspect-held-aboard-warship-is-returned-tous/2013/10/14/4b199f5e-3501-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html.
3. Deborah Feyerick and Lateef Mungin, Alleged al Qaeda Operative Abu Anas Al Libi
Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/justice/al-libicase/.
4. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). See also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. DOC. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24,
1970) (asserting that “[t]he principle of sovereign equality of States,” and in particular that
“[t]he territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable.”).
5. Albrect Randelzhofer & Georg Nolte, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 216 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
6. See Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013), available at SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226359&download
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A. Libyan Consent
It is not clear, as a matter of fact, whether Libya consented to the entry and
presence of U.S. forces on its territory. The Libyan Government has stated
publicly that it did not consent to the U.S. operation, while U.S. officials
have said that Libya knew of the operation in advance, and did not object
to it.7 Assuming that the Libyan Government did consent to the presence
of U.S. forces on its territory, there are two subsidiary issues: the scope and
quality of Libya’s consent.8
As to scope, the activities undertaken by the actor State’s forces must
be within the limits of the consent granted by the territorial State.9 Libyan
consent, tacit or otherwise, would need specifically to have authorized the
capture operation. Given the conflicting positions of the protagonist governments, it is presently impossible to conclude whether the U.S. action
was within the scope of any consent granted by Libya.
With regard to the quality of consent, must the actor-State ensure that
the individual giving consent carries his government’s authority? The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has frequently held that the consent of a
State official, even if ultra vires under that State’s constitutional arrangements, is still sufficient to bind the State.10 The only exception to this rule
is where the domestic incapacity of the State official is known to the other
State, or is “manifest.”11 Accordingly, international law permits the U.S. to

=yes [hereinafter Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting]. The circumstances that might
preclude the wrongfulness of a State breaching the territorial sovereignty of another State
in cases which do not rise to the level of a “use of force” contrary to the United Nations
Charter, Article 2(4) (including necessity, force majeure, distress or countermeasures) are not
applicable. See International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 annex, arts. 20–25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12,
2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles].
7. Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Officials Say Libya Approved Commando Raids, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/world/africa/usofficials-say-libya-approved-commando-raids.html?_r=0.
8. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy,
54 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (2013) [hereinafter Deeks, Consent to the
Use of Force].
9. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 6, art. 20.
10. See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶ 265–66 (Oct. 10).
11. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
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rely upon the consent of a Libyan representative without having to make
further inquiry into his competence.
An additional question is whether consent to an activity is valid when
the territorial State would be forbidden from undertaking that same activity
because of its domestic law. It is a general principle of international law
that a State may not invoke a provision of its domestic law to justify a
breach of its international obligations.12 This means that if Libya granted
the U.S. consent to enter its territory and capture Al-Libi, Libya may not
now renege on its prior consent on the basis that its domestic law prohibited the undertaken activity.
The conflicting positions of the two governments make it impossible
to resolve whether Libya consented to the U.S. operation. The Libyan
Government’s denial of consent may have been intended to address domestic concerns about the presence of U.S. forces in Libya. It is clear,
though, that if Libya provided consent, U.S. forces would be permitted to
enter Libya in order to execute this operation. If Libya did not consent to
the U.S. operation, then the U.S. would have to rely on self-defense as a
lawful basis to breach Libyan sovereignty.
B. Self-Defense
This article makes a distinction in its analysis between the crossing of the
Libyan border and the capture of Al-Libi. Self-defense raises a complexity,
however, because it might be relied upon by the U.S. in two ways. It could
be used to justify only the crossing of Libya’s border, leaving the capture of
Al-Libi to be based upon other grounds—the law of war, for example. Or,
since international law does not restrict the means by which a State may defend itself, self-defense could also be a justification for the capture operation.13 This section therefore includes both aspects of the operation in its
self-defense analysis.
12. VCLT, supra note 11, art. 27; MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 941 (6th
ed. 2008). For a critique of this position, see Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force, supra note 8.
The ILC Draft Articles similarly forbid a “responsible” State from relying on its internal
law as a justification for a failure to comply with its obligations under Part Two of the
draft. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 6, art. 32.
13. Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 736, n.5 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, StateSponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v Alvarez-Machain, 86 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 746, 749 (1992).
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states that “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”14 There are three possibilities as to what armed attack the U.S.
might be responding to, if Al-Libi’s capture is to be analyzed under a selfdefense paradigm. The first is that the 1998 embassy bombings, in which
Al-Libi allegedly played a leading role, may continue to provide a basis for
U.S. action in self-defense.15 The second is that Al-Libi’s capture was conducted in the face of a single “imminent” attack against the U.S., which AlLibi was planning. The third is that Al-Libi, as a member of Al-Qaeda, was
engaged in a campaign of attacks.16
Under all three justifications, the perpetrator of the armed attack is a
non-State actor. With regard to the second and third justifications, the U.S.
would be in the position of acting in self-defense in anticipation of an expected armed attack, rather than in response to an ongoing or completed
attack. This section will address these non-State actor and anticipation issues, followed by the traditional immediacy, necessity and proportionality
requirements of self-defense.
There is dispute as to whether the law of self-defense extends to attacks by non-State actors.17 The I.C.J. has been unwilling to consider
claims of self-defense against non-State actors whose acts were not directly
attributable to a State.18 However, the plain text of Article 51 does not limit the right of self-defense to armed attacks by States. Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, States have recognized the right of self14. U.N. Charter art. 51.
15. This position has been recently advanced in Christian Henderson, The Extraterritorial Seizure of Individuals under International Law—The Case of al-Liby: Part I, EJIL: TALK!
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-extraterritorial-seizure-of-individuals-underinternational-law-the-case-of-al-liby-part-one/#more-9728.
16. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 6, at 13–14 n.59, suggests that
terrorist groups may act like the military forces of a State and conduct campaigns that consist of related but separate operations punctuated with pauses to allow for regrouping,
resupply, etc.
17. See, e.g., Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of SelfDefense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 769 (2012); Randelzhofer & Nolte, supra note 5, at 1416–
19.
18. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed Activities in the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter
Armed Activities].
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defense in response to “armed attacks” not attributable to a State.19 For
example, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and
1373 (2001) clearly reference “self-defense” and “collective self-defense”
measures in response to the 9/11 attacks at a time when the international
community knew the attacks were perpetrated by a non-State actor. The
present authors join many others who regard this debate as largely settled
in favor of this latter view. The U.S. also takes this position.20
The White House fact sheet on the conduct of extraterritorial operations against non-State actors balances the victim State’s right to defend
itself and the territorial State’s right to sovereignty.21 Under the concept of
sovereignty, a State has the right to protect its borders from incursions, but
also has the duty to prevent its territory from being used by others as the
launching point for an armed attack against another State. This balanced
approach requires the territorial State to be given a reasonable opportunity
to suppress the threat originating from its territory before the victim State
exercises self-defense, although the notice requirement is not necessary in
every case.22 If the territorial State fails (or would fail) to act, because it is
unwilling or unable to meet its external obligations, the victim State may
lawfully exercise its right of self-defense, even without notice.23 There is
19. See Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 6, at 9; Armed Activities, supra note 18, Separate Opinion Judge Simma, ¶ 11.
20. U.S. Department of Justice Draft White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated
Force, 2 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413
_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Address at Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama
Administration and International Law, (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/ releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter Koh speech].
21. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and
Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-forcecounterterrorism [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet].
22. See Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 6, at 10.
23. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 21 (requiring “[a]n assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where the action is contemplated cannot or
will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the
Law, and the National Defense, 126 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 89, 108 (1989); Ashley S. Deeks,
“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2012) [hereinafter Deeks, Unwilling or Unable]. See also Philip Alston, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc.
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more than a century of State practice that supports this approach.24 If the
U.S. concluded that an armed attack was being (or was about to be) perpetrated by Al-Libi from Libyan territory, then the U.S. would be obliged to
notify Libya in order for Libya to halt the attack. However, if the U.S. also
concluded that Libya was unwilling or unable to prevent the attack from
occurring, or that Al-Libi would be tipped off, then the U.S. could proceed
to act in self-defense without notification.
Most States and scholars accept the general concept of anticipatory
self-defense, when an armed attack is imminent.25 However, there is no
consensus as to when an armed attack can be said to be imminent.26 The
Caroline doctrine permit[s] anticipatory self-defense when the “necessity of
self-defense [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation.”27 While some view this standard as limiting selfdefense temporally to immediately before an armed attack,28 such an approach makes little sense in an era when catastrophic terrorist attacks can
occur without warning.29 Accordingly, an alternative approach is the “last
feasible window of opportunity” standard.30 Under this interpretation, a
State, instead, may act in self-defense when the attacker is clearly committed to launching an attack, and the victim State would otherwise lose its
opportunity to defend itself unless it acted immediately.
A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) (“A targeted killing conducted by one State in the
territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the
second State consents, or (b) the first, targeting, State has a right under international law to
use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, because . . . the second State
is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory.”).
24. Deeks, Unwilling or Unable, supra note 8 at 486.
25. Randelzhofer & Nolte, supra note 5, at 1423.
26. Id., at 1421.
27. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 412 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906).
28. See, DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187–92
(1958).
29. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 6, at 12.
30. Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, 32 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 110 (2002); U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder,
Remarks as prepared for delivery at Northwestern University School of Law, Mar. 5, 2012,
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/text-of-the-attorney-generals-nationalsecurity-speech/ (stating that the criteria for evaluating imminence include “considerations
of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window
would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future attacks against the United
States.”).
823
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In the context of a campaign of attacks, anticipatory self-defense raises
the following question. Does a State have to make an independent imminence determination for each potential future attack or is the fact of a
campaign of attacks sufficient? Arguably, if a group is clearly mounting a
campaign of attacks, self-defense would be permitted and would not independently need to meet the imminence criterion for each individual potential attack.31 This is certainly the view of the U.S.,32 and the authors are
broadly supportive of this approach.
In the Al-Libi case, the U.S. has not provided any information about
whether it expected (or expects) any particular attack from Al Qaeda, or
whether Al-Libi’s capture averted an attack. Many news agencies report Al
Qaeda’s involvement in the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi.
On the other hand, President Obama has repeatedly asserted that core Al
Qaeda is “on the way to defeat” and that affiliates, such as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, lack the capacity for a major strike.33 Somewhat contrary to these statements, in order for the U.S. operation to be justified under
“anticipatory” self-defense, the U.S. would have to believe that Al-Libi’s
capture was conducted in anticipation of an imminent attack by him against
the U.S., or that Al Qaeda is still perpetrating a campaign of attacks in
which Al-Libi is involved.
If, however, the U.S. exercised self-defense, not in anticipation of an
imminent attack or in response to an ongoing attack(s), but instead in response to an attack which has already occurred, then the U.S.’s use of force
must be within a period of time not too remote from the initial armed attack. This immediacy requirement is based on a reasonableness standard in
light of the circumstances at the time. In this case, Al-Libi’s participation
in the U.S. embassy attacks in east Africa occurred in 1998, 15 years prior
to his capture. In the authors’ view the use of force to effectuate his cap-

31. Schmitt, supra note 6, at 13–14.
32. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security, Harvard Law School:
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennanstrengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; White House Fact Sheet, supra note 21.
33. Fred Lucas, Obama Has Touted Al Qaeda’s Demise 32 Times since Benghazi Attack,
CNS NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-al-qaeda-sdemise-32-times-benghazi-attack-0; Carlo Muños, President: Al Qaeda is “on the way to defeat”,
THE HILL (Aug. 7, 2013), http://thehill.com/video/administration/316057-obama-saysal-qaeda-on-way-to-defeat.
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ture in 2013, if exclusively based on his participation in the embassy bombings, fails the immediacy criterion of self-defense.
The use of force in every instance of self-defense must be limited to
what is necessary and proportionate.34 Necessity “requires that there be no
alternative to the use of force effectively to defeat an attack that is either
imminent or underway.”35 Accordingly, an assessment must be undertaken
of the prospects of success for alternative courses of action which do not
amount to a use of force. Thus, the use of force to capture Al-Libi could
satisfy the necessity principle if, for example, cooperative law enforcement
measures to arrest and extradite Al-Libi were expected to fail.
Proportionality addresses the quantity of force that a State can use in
self-defense, restricting it to only that force required to eliminate the threat
or end the attack.36 Since Al-Libi’s capture was a limited incursion into
Libyan territory, a use of minimum, non-deadly force, the authors propound that Al-Libi’s capture was a proportionate means of eliminating the
threat of an armed attack.
In conclusion, the U.S. has not yet sought to use self-defense as a public justification for the operation, and has instead relied upon the assertion
of Libyan consent. The consent justification, if factually accurate, is in
compliance with international law. No information provided publicly thus
far supports the exercise of self-defense.
III. THE CAPTURE OF AL-LIBI
Part II considered the U.S. operation from the perspective of Libyan sovereignty. This Part addresses what grounds in law the U.S. might have had
for capturing Al-Libi, irrespective of the sovereignty (or border crossing)
issue. International law norms applicable to the capture and subsequent
detention of an individual differ dependent upon whether the capturing
State is a party to an armed conflict or not. Because the U.S. has repeatedly
asserted that it is engaged in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)
with Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, this paradigm will be considered first,

34. See Randelzhofer & Nolte, supra note 5, at 1425; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 176, 194 (June 27); Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July
8); Oil Platforms (Iran v U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76 (Nov. 6).
35. See Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 6, at 11.
36. Id., at 12.
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followed by an examination of whether there is any other lawful basis for
Al-Libi’s capture in the absence of an armed conflict.
A. Capture during a non-international armed conflict
Al-Libi allegedly is or has been a leading and influential member of core Al
Qaeda. If true, the existence of a lawful basis for his capture turns on the
following: (1) whether the U.S. is in a NIAC with al-Qaeda; (2) the geographical limits to the NIAC, if any; and, (3) the circumstances under
which the law of armed conflict permits capture.
The U.S. has justified Al-Libi’s capture under the laws of war.37 The viability of this justification depends in the first place upon the existence of a
NIAC between the U.S. and Al Qaeda, which is determined though the
broadly accepted test set out in Prosecutor v. Tadić: “[A] [non-international]
armed conflict exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups, or between
such groups within a State.”38 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld decision, the U.S. has stated that it is a party to a NIAC with Al
Qaeda.39 However, the U.S. position is not universally accepted. Under
strict application of the Tadić test, some scholars have queried whether or
not the U.S. remains in a de jure NIAC with Al Qaeda.40 Indeed, even
among the present authors, opinion is divided on this question of fact.
If one accepts that there is a NIAC, then the second issue is the geographic limitations, if any, of the NIAC. Common Article 3 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which is applicable to conflicts “not of an international character,” anticipated that such conflicts would occur within the
confines of a single State.41 Notwithstanding this intention, today, the
37. See BBC NEWS AFRICA, supra note 1.
38. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia,
Oct. 2, 1995).
39. Koh speech, supra note 20.
40. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global
War on Terror, 12 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 535 (2005);
Kenneth Roth, The War Against al-Qaeda is Over, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-02/opinions/41000898_1_war-powersperpetual-war-human-rights-watch.
41. Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) refers to
“armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties.” (emphasis added). Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of
826
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Hamdan decision interpretation is widely-accepted by other States and numerous scholars, indicating that a NIAC need not be geographically limited
to the territory of a single State. This, then, raises the question of whether
there are any geographical limitations when a NIAC is not restricted to the
territory of a single State.42
The U.S. subscribes to a view that a NIAC occurs where the parties are
located, even if the parties are located in more than one State.43 Accordingly, the mere presence of the enemy in a State is sufficient to say that the
NIAC is taking place there.44 Despite this broad interpretation of the geography question, restrictions on action still exist. The presence of the enemy
in another State does not provide sufficient grounds, alone, for the actor
State to breach the territorial State’s sovereignty. Instead, the actor State
must still justify the violation of sovereignty on one of the grounds discussed in Part II. While the authors agree that the clarity of the U.S. approach has much to commend it as lex ferenda, it does not appear to be reflected in other State responses to U.S. drone strikes against Al Qaeda
members beyond the borders of Afghanistan, which is often characterized
by vehement opposition to U.S. practice.45

the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
42. For discussion, see Louise Arimatsu, Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 157 (2009); Claus Kress,
Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflict, 15
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245 (2010); Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extra-Territorial Non-International Armed Conflicts 89 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES 696 (2013).
43. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 21; SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 250–52 (2012).
44. Although Sivakumaran argues the more remote from the scene of the conflict, the
specificities of the law may change, requiring a higher threshold for lethal targeting, for
example. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 43, at 251.
45. E.g., a U.K. cabinet minister has recently condemned the U.S. use of drones in
Pakistan and Yemen as a means of prosecuting the conflict with Al-Qaeda. See Paul Vale,
Barack Obama Lambasted by Cabinet Minister Ed Davey Over Drone Strikes in Pakistan, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/11/14/eddavey-barack-obama-drones_n_4277940.html. The new German Government has also
stated it considers extraterritorial drone strikes “illegal.” Germany Stops Buying Armed Drones,
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The third question addresses the legal basis for detention in a NIAC.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has said that the
power to capture and detain “flows from the practice of armed conflict and
the logic of international humanitarian law that parties to a conflict may
capture persons deemed to pose a serious security threat and that such persons may be interned as long as they continue to pose a threat.”46 This
ground for detention is forward looking, in that it seeks to prevent the detainee from committing some future act harmful to the detaining State.
While the U.S. has not provided a specific factual basis for Al-Libi’s detention beyond the criminal indictment, as long as he retains his status as a
high ranking member of Al Qaeda, then arguably, he continues to pose a
potentially serious threat to the security of the U.S. and is detainable on this
basis. However, this justification would likely have to reconcile other U.S.
statements that suggest Al Qaeda, as a whole, is now a spent force on its
way to defeat.
Nothing prohibits the U.S. from transferring Al-Libi to the federal
criminal justice system, presuming that he was lawfully captured under the
law of war. Indeed, international law plainly anticipates that members of
organized armed groups in a NIAC may be subjected to the domestic criminal jurisdiction of the State party to the conflict.47
B. Alternative Bases for Capture
While many still view the conflict with Al Qaeda as a NIAC, if the situation
no longer crosses this threshold, then Al-Libi’s capture must be examined
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2013), http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/ archive/segment/germany-stops-buying-armed-drones/528520e3fe34444eb1000407.
46. Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-International Armed
Conflict, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 859, 863 (2009). This ground
was also implicitly accepted by the group of States that participated in the Copenhagen
Process, resulting in a set of non-legally binding principles and guidelines on the handling
of detainees in “internationalised internal armed conflict and in peace operations.” Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, The
Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, ¶ 12 (2012), available at
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Cop
enhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen
Principles]. Another author has said detention is a corollary of the power to target individuals during an armed conflict. SIVAKUMARAN supra note 43, at 301–02.
47. Common Article 3(1)(d); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 6, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
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under general international law, and not the lex specialis of the law of armed
conflict. Without reliance on the law of armed conflict, Al-Libi’s capture
and subsequent detention then would be governed by international law
norms regulating the extraterritorial enforcement of a State’s domestic jurisdiction and human rights law.48
As Part II showed, in the absence of consent of the territorial State, or
any other lawful basis in self-defense, Al-Libi’s capture would amount to an
unlawful infringement of Libyan sovereignty, and an improper extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. domestic criminal jurisdiction. Historically
though, an unlawful capture has not provided the criminal defendant with a
basis for challenging the State’s criminal jurisdiction over him. The principle male captus bene detentus provides that “a person improperly seized may
nevertheless properly be detained (and brought to trial).”49
In U.S. v. Alvarez Machain,50 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the seizure of Alvarez-Machain by U.S. agents in Mexico was
“shocking” and likely to be “in violation of general international law principles,” but did not vitiate the jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court to try
him.51 A similar position was reached by the English Divisional Court in R
v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Driver.52 In probably the most famous extraterritorial seizure case of all, the Supreme Court of Israel adopted the same approach in the Eichmann case.53 Contemporary commentators agreed that
male captus bene detentus is a rule of international law, although many have
been critical of it.54 It must be noted though, that male captus bene detentus
pre-dates substantial developments in international human rights law.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in Öcalan v. Turkey,55
recently considered the issue of extraterritorial enforcement from a human
rights perspective. Öcalan was wanted in Turkey for offenses related to
terrorism. He managed to escape to Kenya, but was later detained by the
48. See generally SHAW, supra note 12, at 688.
49. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 305 (1989).
50. U.S. v. Alvarez Machain 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
51 Alvarez, supra note 50, at 669.
52. R v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Driver [1986] QB 1, at 95 (Eng.).
53. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. 1962) (Isr); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
54. See generally, Halberstam, supra note 13; Glennon, supra note 13. See also, Beth van
Schaack, Al-Liby: Male Captus, Bene Detentus?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/07/Al-Libi-male-captus-bene-detentus/.
55. Öcalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
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Kenyan authorities in order to return him to Turkey to face trial. The ECtHR held that his transfer to Turkish jurisdiction was conducted with the
consent and co-operation of the Kenyan government such that it did not
breach Öcalan’s human right to freedom from arbitrary detention. However, the ECtHR opined that without Kenyan consent, Turkey would not
have had criminal jurisdiction over Öcalan,56 because an extraterritorial
capture would not have been in accordance with a “procedure prescribed
by law” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 1950 Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (or EHCR).57
The Öcalan decision focused on the interpretation of Article 5 of the
ECHR, and so it is plainly not binding on the U.S. But Article 5 of the
ECHR and Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)58 are united in forbidding arrest and detention which is
not “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” The U.S. has ratified the latter instrument.59 Although the U.S. does not accept the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, it does acknowledge that it is globally
bound by customary human rights law.60 Of relevance to the Al-Libi case,
the U.S. recognizes that customary human rights law contains a prohibition
against arbitrary detention.61 It is not clear, however, that a U.S. tribunal
would interpret the word “arbitrary” to include unlawful extraterritorial
arrest as the ECtHR has done.
While many jurisdictions continue to recognize the “male captus bene detentus” doctrine, there are contradictory decisions from the same courts
which have indicated that in some instances, jurisdiction ought to be de-

56. Id., ¶ 99. Öcalan’s argument that there could be no jurisdiction is summarized at
id., ¶ 79.
57. Id., ¶¶ 90–97. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 5(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
58. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
59. The ratification date (June 8, 1992) is available on the UN Treaty Collection database, http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter
=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
60. For a summary of the history of the U.S. position regarding the extraterritorial
application of human rights law (treaty and customary), see Beth Van Schaack, United
States Report to the UN Human Rights Committee: Lex Specialis and Extraterritoriality, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 16, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/16/united-states-5th-periodicreview/.
61. Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
702 (1987).
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clined.62 It is therefore possible that since the Alvarez-Machain decision customary international law has been developing beyond the male captus bene
detentus principle. Consequently, Al-Libi conceivably could contest U.S.
criminal jurisdiction using this potential customary human rights norm as
the basis for his challenge.63 If he did, the likelihood of success would be
remote since a court would need to conclude that Al-Libi was not lawfully
captured under the law of armed conflict, and that a customary norm has
developed beyond Alvarez-Machain. The court also would have to grapple
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedence.
IV. AL-LIBI’S SUBSEQUENT DETENTION
This part begins by presuming there is a subsisting NIAC between the U.S.
and Al Qaeda and will assess whether Al-Libi’s detention is lawful under
the law of armed conflict. In a NIAC, once an individual is captured, the
law of armed conflict provides the detainee with certain protections. Protections relevant to Al-Libi’s case will be explored in the first section of this
part, and will address whether the law of armed conflict permits the U.S to
detain Al-Libi on board a warship. The lex specialis of the law of armed
conflict may be relied upon in a NIAC by the detaining State, instead of the
narrower constrains on detention found in human rights law.64 This Part
will also consider Al-Libi’s case exclusively under human rights norms, in
the alternative to a NIAC.

62. In the U.S., see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); in the
U.K., see R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90
(Eng.). For other examples see Glennon, supra note 13, at 750, n.22.
63. The concurring opinion of Breyer, J. in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133
S.Ct. 1659 (2013) indicates a willingness in the U.S. Supreme Court to allow allegations of
extraterritorial breaches of customary human rights law against the U.S. government to be
litigated in U.S. federal courts. Although this case was in the context of civil litigation under the Alien Tort Statute, the general principle has obvious potential to read across to
questions of criminal jurisdiction.
64. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 9 and ECHR, supra note 57, art. 5(2). The former contemplates arrest or detention on the basis of criminal charges only, and the latter
sets out a finite list of circumstances in which it is lawful to detain an individual. Both
articles require that detention will be “promptly” considered by a judge and subject to
periodic judicial review thereafter, whereas the law of armed conflict requires only administrative, rather than judicial, oversight of detention.
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A. Detention in a NIAC
The rules governing detention in a NIAC are not as well developed as
those in international armed conflict (IAC). Only some of the detention
norms designed for IACs are applicable in NIACs.65 In particular, NIAC
treaty law contains a limited set of norms on treatment and an absence of
rules governing the procedural guarantees for security detention.
It would not be appropriate to import the full panoply of the IAC rules
for detention into a NIAC. As noted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case:
[t]he emergence of the aforementioned general rules on internal armed
conflicts does not imply that internal strife is regulated by general international law in all its aspects. Two particular limitations may be noted: (i)
only a number of rules and principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts; and (ii)
this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical
transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the general essence
of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.66

Instead, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions serves as
a baseline standard for treatment upon capture in a NIAC.
Common Article 3 prohibits the murder, mutilation, cruel treatment,
torture, and outrages upon personal dignity of all persons taking no active
part in hostilities.67 It also protects those detained from criminal sentencing without due process, affording “all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”68 Additional Protocol II
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions elaborates further upon the safeguards
provided for in Common Article 3.69 U.S. policy regarding the treatment
65. See, e.g., Copenhagen Principles, supra note 46. For the ICRC position on what
rules should govern detention in NIACs, see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards
for Internment / Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and other Situations of Violence, 87
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375 (2005).
66. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 126 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999). The reference to “internal conflicts” is
general accepted to refer to NIACs.
67. Common Article 3(1).
68. Common Article 3(1)(d).
69. AP II, supra note 47, arts. 4–6.
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of detainees in a NIAC accounts for basic humanitarian protections provided for in both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.70
There has been no allegation that the conditions of Al-Libi’s detention
have failed to comply with the standards set out above. However, some
have claimed that the mere detention on a warship, per se, is unlawful.
Those who have made this allegation point to Geneva Convention III, (GC
III), Article 22, which provides that “[p]risoners-of-war may be interned
only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene
and healthfulness.”71 However, it is important to highlight that GC III,
Article 22, is applicable only in IACs, and cannot automatically be imported to a NIAC. Furthermore, even in an IAC, Article 22’s applicability only
extends to those who have satisfied the criteria for prisoners of war status.
Specifically, in order to achieve prisoner of war status, an individual must
come within one of the categories contemplated in GC III, Article 4A. AlLibi does not fall into any of these categories; nor is the conflict in question
an IAC. Article 22 therefore does not apply to his detention.
Others may argue that while Article 22 per se does not apply in a NIAC,
“the general essence” of the article should be applicable during a NIAC on
the basis of Tadić.72 This position is difficult to maintain, however. The
most comprehensive legal instrument governing NIACs, which is Additional Protocol II, does not contain a rule equivalent to Article 22.73 Moreover, the rule is hardly all-encompassing during an IAC; for example, there

70. As a non-Party to Additional Protocol II, the United States is not bound by its
provisions, but the U.S. Secretary of State has said specifically that the Protocol is reflective of U.S. practice and signaled its intent to seek Senate advice and consent for ratification. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Press Statement: Reaffirming America’s Commitment to Humane Treatment of Detainees (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/157827.htm. See also Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program ¶ 4.1 (Sept. 5,
2006) (providing that “[a] detainee shall be treated humanely and in accordance with U.S.
law, the law of war and applicable U.S. policy.”).
71. Emphasis added. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Libyan al-Qaida Suspect’s Detention-atSea Raises Geneva Convention Concerns, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.theguardian .com/world/2013/oct/08/us-detention-libya-al-liby-ship.
72. Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 126.
73. AP II, supra note 47, art. 5. Moreover, the AP II Commentary on Article 5 makes
no mention that such a rule was even discussed in the drafting of AP II. COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 4564–96 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann
eds., 1987).
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is no equivalent provision for those detained under Geneva Convention IV
(GC IV).
The absolutism of Article 22’s prohibition against at-sea detention for
prisoners of war has been questioned, even in the context of GC III.74 For
example, the ICRC calls for the “sensible interpretation” of Article 22.75
This is because historically the article had two motivations. First, during
the Second World War prisoners of war had been held in ships in unsanitary and unsafe conditions, in particular by Japan.76 Second, belligerent
ships (a fortiori warships) were at significant risk of enemy attack, potentially
placing any prisoners in danger. These factors are now of less concern than
they were at the time of Article 22’s drafting.
In contrast to Second World War shipboard detention, modern ships
(particularly an advanced amphibious command platform such as the USS
San Antonio), which are equipped with more than adequate protections
from the extremes of temperature and weather, are able to provide sanitary,
hygienic conditions and sufficient food and water. In addition, a U.S. warship at sea provides safe conditions for detention without significant risk of
enemy attack in the context of the NIAC between the U.S. and Al Qaeda.
More recently, other States have detained prisoners of war aboard warships in keeping with the ICRC’s invitation to read Article 22 sensibly. In
some circumstances, detention at sea might even be more humane than
detention ashore. During the 1982 Falklands Conflict, Argentina, after bilateral discussions with the U.K., agreed that its prisoners of war could be
held at sea aboard British warships.77 This decision was no doubt reached
on the basis that a U.K. warship afforded better protection during the
South Atlantic winter than make-shift accommodations ashore on the
wind-swept Falkland Islands.
The final objection to shipboard detention may include concern over a
detainee’s access to impartial humanitarian bodies, such as the ICRC.
Common Article 3 expressly provides that such groups may “offer their
services.” The U.S., as a matter of policy, notifies the ICRC of any deten74. Gregory P. Noone et. al., Prisoners of War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare
50 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 1 (2004). For a concise discussion of the basis for Article 22 and
flexibility in its application during modern conflicts, see also Peter Margulies, Al-Libi and
Detention at Sea, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/AlLibi-and-detention-at-sea/.
75. Margulies, supra note 74.
76. A.J. BARKER, PRISONERS OF WAR (1975).
77. Noone et. al., supra note 74.
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tions and grants access to detainees in all but exceptional situations.78 Indeed, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, who was held aboard a warship by the
U.S., was visited by the ICRC.79 Critics of Warsame’s detention have posited that shipboard detention risks the perception that the ship represents a
“black site” in which unlawful interrogation techniques might be used.80
However, that has not proven to be the case, either with Warsame or, as
far as can be known, Al-Libi. There have been no complaints that either of
the shipboard detentions was inhumane, or conducted in violation of the
Common Article 3 standards.
It remains to be seen whether prolonged detention at sea may, as a
matter of fact, become inhumane and therefore unlawful. Factors which
could jeopardize the legitimacy of detention at sea might include duration
and the adequacy of medical care (whether generally or in relation to a detainee’s specific condition). In addition, extreme weather or sea state for
an extended period might also risk rendering conditions inhumane. These
matters must be determined by the facts as they exist. Furthermore, there is
no indication that detention at sea would present procedural ambiguities
(such as length of detention, periodic reviews) beyond those that already
pertain to detention on land. There is no per se prohibition against detention on a warship in a NIAC.
B. Detention under Human Rights Law
If Al-Libi’s detention was not based on the lex specialis of the law of armed
conflict, it must be examined under the general principles of international
law, i.e., human rights law. While human rights law does not prohibit detention at sea as a matter of course,81 there are several other factors that
must be considered.
78. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 190–8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, ¶ 5.1(5) (Oct. 1, 1997).
79. Charles Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (July 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/world/ africa/07detain.html. One of the authors of this paper was present onboard when Ahmed
Abdulkadir Warsame was detained.
80. Tom Parker, A Dangerous Somali Fudge, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 8, 2011)
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/a-dangerous-somali-fudge/; Spenser Ackerman, Drift:
How this Ship Became a Floating Gitmo, WIRED (July 6, 2011) http://www.wired.com
/dangerroom/2011/07/ floating-gitmo/.
81. The ECtHR has dealt with several cases concerning the detention of pirates and
others at sea and has never found that detention at sea is per se a breach of any human
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The ECHR and ICCPR both state that persons arrested or detained
must be brought “promptly” before a judge.82 This is a requirement that is
broadly reflected in human rights instruments and State practice, which
could mean it is now reflective of customary human rights law, and therefore, may apply to Al-Libi’s detention. In Öcalan, the ECtHR held that
Turkey breached this rule, as reflected in ECHR, Article 5(3), when Öcalan
was not brought before a judge until seven days after his detention.83 In
Brogan v. UK, a case concerning individuals suspected of terrorism, the
court found that a period of four days and six hours without review by a
judge amounted to a breach of Article 5(3).84 However, in Medvedyev v.
France, the court found that 13 days’ detention at sea, without judicial oversight, did not breach Article 5(3) because it was not “materially possible” to
bring the detainees before a judge any sooner.85 In this case the circumstances were of pirates captured at sea whose transfer to the territory of the
detaining State, France, took 13 days. On arrival, the detainees were put
before a judge within a few hours, so that as soon as it was “materially possible” the detaining State had complied with Article 5(3). The flexibility in
Medvedev is also reflected in several similar U.S. domestic cases.86
Human rights law, therefore, does not provide a strict time limit. Instead, circumstances, such as the location of detention and the possibility
of judicial oversight, are taken into account in determining when an indirights norm. See, e.g., Medvedyev and others v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010); Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
82. ECHR, supra note 57, art. 5(3); ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 9(3).
83. Öcalan, supra note 55, ¶¶ 100–05.
84. Brogan and others v. United Kingdom, ¶ 62, App. No. 11209/84, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1988).
85. Medvedyev, supra note 81, ¶¶ 127–34,
86. See, United States v. Purvis, 768 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that five days
between arrest at sea and presentation before a magistrate was not “unreasonable delay”
even though, after arrest, the Coast Guard cutter continued its normal law enforcement
activities, did not proceed to nearest U.S. port, and stopped for 8 hours to attempt to sink
an abandoned vessel); United States v. Greyshock, 719 F. Supp. 927, 932–33 (D. Haw.
1989) (deciding that nine days between arrest at sea and presentation before a magistrate
was not “unreasonable delay,” and rejecting contention that government should have airlifted defendants to a magistrate or have permitted defendants access to Coast Guard
communication equipment to contact a magistrate); United States v. Savchenko, 201
F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (whereas 16 days might be deemed unreasonable for the delay
in first appearance concerning an arrest at the International Border with Mexico, some 16
miles south of the courthouse, the 16 days is more than reasonable for the transport of the
fishing vessel from the high seas approximately 500 nautical miles from Mexico to this
district under these facts and circumstances).
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vidual must be brought before a judge. None of these cases suggest a special exception for situations of terrorism.87 If the U.S. can show that AlLibi was put before a judge in New York as soon as it was “materially possible” this rule will not have been breached.
V. CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial capture of Abu Anas Al-Libi raises questions in international law ranging from the circumstances in which it is legitimate for
a State to infringe another State’s sovereignty to the specific conditions of
detention under both the law of armed conflict and general international
law. This article has not been able to draw conclusions on every issue
raised due to gaps in the known factual narrative. However, the foregoing
analysis does allow for the statement of certain principles which may inform the conduct of future similar operations.
(1) Consent of the territorial State will always be the most straightforward legal basis for what would otherwise be an unlawful infringement of the territorial State’s sovereignty. Obtaining consent
will not always be possible, however, and so alternative legal bases
may need to be considered.
(2) Where the sovereignty infringement rises to the level of a “use
of force,” as it did in the Al-Libi case, the only other legal basis for
crossing the border will be self-defense. As this article has shown,
self-defense might be used as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the whole capture operation. However it might also be
limited to justifying the infringement of sovereignty, with an alternative legal basis (such as in the law of armed conflict) justifying
the capture. In either case, the actor State will need to show that
action in self-defense is in response to an “armed attack,” imminent
or actual. In an operation such as this, conducted against a nonState actor, the actor State needs to be satisfied that the territorial
State is either unwilling or unable to prevent the armed attack
about to be perpetrated from its soil before it may act in selfdefense.

87. This is apparent in the ECtHR’s reasoning in Brogan, supra note 84, ¶¶ 56–61.
837

International Law Studies

2013

(3) The capture part of the operation may be grounded in the law
armed conflict applicable in a NIAC where the individual(s) to be
captured represent a threat to the security of the actor State. Before a capture is affected under the law of NIAC, the actor State
needs to be satisfied that the individual(s) to be captured is within
the geographic bounds of that NIAC. If the view that the law follows the parties is representative of international law, then the mere
presence of the enemy in the territorial State is sufficient to conclude the NIAC is taking place in that State. Following a capture
grounded in the law of armed conflict applicable in a NIAC, a capturing State is entitled to transfer the captured individual into its
domestic criminal jurisdiction.
(4) If there is no NIAC ground for capture, then the capture operation must be compliant with general international law norms governing extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law. Historically, where such norms were breached during capture, this did
not prevent the capturing State from subjecting the individual in
custody to criminal trial. Whether customary human rights law has
developed to eclipse or alter this rule is unclear, but in the U.S. the
principle male captus bene detentus remains, for now, enshrined in the
Supreme Court Alvarez-Machain decision.
(5) Whether the capture is affected under NIAC law or general international law, there is no norm which prevents per se the detention
of captured persons at sea, in a warship. NIAC law does require
detainees be treated humanely and that international organizations
such as the ICRC be granted access in all but extraordinary circumstances. Detention at sea is perfectly able to meet these requirements. Where the capture is governed by general international law,
customary human rights law may provide that captured individuals
are required to be put “promptly” before a judge as soon as it is
“materially possible.”

838

